Relativism and Human Rights
Claudio Corradetti - 13 maggio 2009 [...] My argument, instead, is that the entire domain of human understanding is sensitive to rule-governed practices based upon what I will term as “experientialism”. To claim that understanding and meaning are strictly embedded within social practices does not amount to say that world’s objects do not exist independently from our cognitive activities. Indeed, too often ontological issues, as those concerning the very existence of an external word, have been confused with the epistemological ones. While ontology is existentially independent from our knowledge, this latter always projects classiﬁcatory standards to ontological independent objects both institutional and non institutional [...]
We live in a rule-constrained world. Even our most insigniﬁcant practices are somehow dependent upon a socially agreed standard regulating their structures, procedures, and general goals. We can, for instance, appreciate our neighbour’s ability to keep her garden tidy and in good shape, but we can also observe the unusual combination of ingredients in the preparation of an exotic dish, or be impressed
by the reﬁned style of Chinese pots. We can discuss and disagree about whether our moral judgments are sufﬁciently argued and produce well-founded contrasting arguments. What happens in all cases is that our diverging opinions are defended on the basis of compliance with a rule, a standard which we consider as deserving priority over alternative considerations. If, in contrast to the experiential pervasiveness
of norms, their appreciation were restricted to certain domains of human action, there would be little resistance to the idea of a social construction of reality [...]
Questo testo, per gentile concessione dell'editore, è tratto da Claudio Corradetti, Relativism and Human Rights. A Theory of Pluralistic Universalism, Springer, 2009. Si ringrazia Springer per il permesso di utilizzare questi materiali.
Questo documento è soggetto a una licenza Creative Commons